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Undocumented Migrant Workers in a
Fragmented International Order
CHANTAL THOMAS†
_______________________

This Paper tries to show the effects of a central challenge of
contemporary global governance: the ―interaction between normative
orders that are fundamentally different in their underlying conceptual
structure.‖1 The argument is that the dynamics of globalization create
and accentuate particular social phenomena as well as efforts towards
coordinated regulation of these phenomena, but that the latter are far
from sufficient to meet the former. A further assertion is that global
relations and distributions of power determine the operation of this
fragmented framework. Social vulnerability is reflected in and
reinforced by it. As such, the undocumented migrant worker
challenges, in many senses of the term, the margins of global
governance and international law: the boundaries reflected in
sovereign territoriality which continue to undergird international law,
and to represent the limits of its permissible jurisdiction, and yet
which are challenged by the aspiration towards globalization
embodied physically in the person of the undocumented migrant
worker.
† Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Sincere thanks to the editors of the
Maryland Journal of International Law for their assistance. I am grateful to the
University of Maryland School of Law, and especially Professors Michael Van
Alstine and Peter Danchin, for assembling such a fantastic conversation. Earlier
versions of this Paper were presented to meetings of the Law and Society
Association and the Labor Law and Development Research Network; my thanks to
the participants in those discussions for their valuable comments. Errors are of
course mine alone.
1. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 869, 873 (1988).
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In this sense, the undocumented migrant both fulfills and
transgresses the global order. This Paper represents a series of
meditations on this theme. Parts I and II indicate the broader reaches
of this analysis, discussing ―illegal markets‖ in the global order more
generally and clarifying theoretical and methodological
commitments. Parts III and IV examine in more detail the figure of
the undocumented migrant worker at both the international and
national plane. Parts V and VI ―cash out‖ both the material and
discursive effects of the current approaches to irregular migration.
I. THE ILLEGAL MARKETS PROJECT
This Paper was originally inspired by a project on illegal global
markets, primarily organized crime, drugs, prostitution, trafficking,
and migrant smuggling.2 Although these are very different types of
transactions, my general argument is the same: first, these illegal
markets are an inherent part of globalization; second, the emerging
posture of prohibitionism may not reduce the incidence of illegal
markets and may actually exacerbate their harmful characteristics.
Call these illicit markets the dark side of globalization.3 On
globalization‘s ―bright side,‖4 trade facilitated by multilaterally
coordinated market rules yields aggregate welfare gains. 5 On this
dark side, in law‘s shadow, massive disparities between (poor)
2. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, International Law Against Sex Trafficking in
Perspective (Oct. 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Wisconsin-Harvard
Workshop on International Economic Law and Transnational Regulation) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Thomas, International Law Against Sex Trafficking];
Chantal Thomas et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal
Responses: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 336 (2006) [hereinafter Thomas et al., From the International to the Local
in Feminist Legal Responses]; Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Border, 41
MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (14th Annual Distinguished Speakers
Series) [hereinafter Thomas, Globalization at the Border].
3. See Moisés Naím, The Fourth Annual Grotius Lecture: Five Wars of
Globalization, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1, 13 (2002). For a treatment of the ―dark
side‖ of international humanitarian and human rights law, see DAVID KENNEDY,
THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM
(2004).
4. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side Of Private Ordering:
An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41,
43 (2000). The usage here reflects that of Milhaupt to discuss domestic illicit trade.
Id.
5. For a discussion of the distributive consequences of trade liberalization, see
generally Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic
Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT‘L L. 285 (2003).
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―sending‖ and (rich) ―receiving‖ countries combine with
sophisticated technologies of production and distribution to produce
volatile dynamics of supply and demand.
Given the global nature of the problem, it is unsurprising that
international law has arisen to stanch the flow through interstate
coordination.6 Such coordination has produced a paradoxical
historical moment, which Peter Andreas has dubbed ―open markets,
closed borders.‖7 That is, at the same time that states have
coordinated to create ―borderless economies‖ in legal goods and
services, they are coordinating to police their borders against illegal
goods and services. Thus, the illegal markets project looks primarily
at the legal rules that seek to prohibit these markets and analyzes the
causes and effects of prohibitionism. I discuss these aspects further
below in Part I.B. (setting out a theory of illegal markets), and Part
III.B. (discussing the prohibitionist regime in contemporary
international criminal law).
A. Illegal Markets and Legal Pluralism
This Part will explore the relationship between my illegal markets
project and the insights of legal pluralism, focusing in particular on
the market for illegal market labor—in other words, for
undocumented migrant workers.
There are overlapping regimes that address illegal migration.
Despite international law‘s pronounced allegiance to free trade and
human rights, neither set of principles addresses illegal migration
very much, although some instruments do exist. Illegal migrants are a
product of globalization driving through and between existing and
emerging legal regimes at the national and international levels.
From a welfare perspective, the general effect of the current
arrangement of legal regimes—which overlap in some areas but leave
gaps in others—is that poor and vulnerable individuals from both
sending and receiving countries suffer.8 Illegal migrants themselves
6. See generally PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE:
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006).
7. Peter Andreas, U.S.–Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Borders, 103 FOREIGN
POL‘Y 51, 51 (1996).
8. The deviations of fragmentation ―should not be understood as legal-technical
‗mistakes.‘ They reflect the differing pursuits and preferences [that] actors in a
pluralistic (global) society have . . . [i]n conditions of social complexity . . . .‖
International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation of
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are subject to a great deal of abuse. And similarly situated native
workers see their bargaining power reduced.
B. A Theory on Criminal Markets in Liberal States
International economic law tends to employ traditional trade
theory to assist its analysis of the legal rules affecting the crossborder flows of goods and people and the underlying economic
characteristics of those flows. Yet without also analyzing illegal
markets, international economic law scholars cannot hope to obtain
an accurate picture of the economy.
At the center of this dynamic is the power of international markets
to erode the nation-state, creating deep tensions between different
conceptual fundaments of Western modernity: the nation-state and
the market.
We can see this with the ongoing civil and political resistance to
imported trade in goods in virtually all societies, regardless of how
well established international trade agreements may be. In the United
States, the increase in trade in goods and the concomitant decrease in
manufacturing has produced a variety of discourses around the need
for maintaining the national economy as a basis for national security
and, more generally, the American way of life. ―Made in the USA‖
campaigns tap into national identity to mobilize against imported
goods. Free trade advocates are at a loss to provide an alternative
identity that is as powerful as that of the nation, with the consequence
that protectionism often takes the form of nationalism. If the
importation of goods presents the nation with a quandary, though, the
importation of people threatens national identity even more.
The nationalist resistance to the importation of goods and labor
presents the modern nation-state with a deep quandary because the
modern Western nation-state is self-consciously liberal. Liberalism
means (1) an embrace of trade and the market; (2) a tolerance for and
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 16 (April 13, 2006) [hereinafter
Fragmentation], available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/
610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement. From a functional perspective, one
could argue that illegal migrant workforces are allowed in, as their legalization is
not politically plausible, so that they get entry and employers (large and small) get
access to their labor, and their families and communities get their remittances.
Thus, there is certainly a logic to the state of affairs, despite its seeming disarray. I
discuss this a bit more in the Conclusion.
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openness to diverse identities (as long as they do not threaten this
basic tolerance—so tolerance is far from neutrality); and (3) a
conception of the individual as fundamentally a right-holder, with all
individuals being equal insofar as they hold rights.
The dilemma means that there will be tensions and forces driving a
restrictive regulatory impulse. The restrictive regulatory impulse is
intended to preserve both the material and ideal status quo. Yet the
regulatory impulse at the same time contradicts an important facet of
that status quo, which is liberalism.
Out of this tension, a mediating dynamic arises, which reconciles
the restrictive impulse with the liberal market-state. The mediating
function arises out of the production and applications of justifications
for regulation in the face of the liberal project. These justifications
are where the public resides: the domain in which ―intervention‖ into
the ―private‖ exchanges of the market (or the family) are justified.
Within liberalism, the default rule is that the state should not
intervene. Where the state does ―intervene,‖ there must be a
justification. Here intervention is understood not as the difference
between regulation and the absence of regulation but rather as the
difference between the idealized mode of regulation and some other
mode.
That is, maintaining the market requires concerted effort on the
part of the state, but that effort is idealized and to a large extent
rendered invisible—the market is seen as the natural and normal
situation. Restricting the market is a highly visible form of regulation
because it departs from this idealized form. Restricting the market
thus requires a raft of justifications (while maintaining a liberalized
market does not, as it is presumed to be the natural state of affairs).
The level of scrutiny applied to the justification varies between
―negative‖ and ―positive‖ liberalism. Negative liberalism, a la Locke,
would require a stronger justification than would positive liberalism a
la Rousseau, where the state is acknowledged to play a much more
proactive role in aiding the citizens in their constitution as such.
The stronger justification, however, requires a stronger response.
Hence, a strong form of negative liberalism may, paradoxically, tend
to produce stronger regulatory responses—because the bar for
regulatory intervention is higher. Once it is reached, the case has
been made for a much stronger threat to the public good, and thus a
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stronger response is required.
Thus, a regime that is self-consciously liberal may tend to be
accompanied by regulatory responses of a prohibitionist or
abolitionist quality. That is the basic dynamic. But what then shapes
the nature of the justifications for regulation—in this case,
prohibition through criminalization? There are two varieties of
justification. One is the legitimate-ideological. The other is the
illegitimate-ideological.
The legitimate-ideological refers to the justifications that are at
home within and accepted by liberalism. Essentially, the legitimateideological justification within classical liberalism is the ―harm‖
principle: individual activities are permitted so long as they do not
cause ―harm‖ to others (J. S. Mill). Where activities are viewed as
dangerous to others, they are not permitted. So public health is a
thoroughly acceptable basis for regulatory intervention from the
classical liberal perspective.
But of course this category only provides general justification. In
fact social activity produces many complex effects and negative
externalities. By itself it is too broad to specify what kinds of
negative externalities will be permitted absolutely, which will be
conditionally permitted, and which will be banned. For example,
within classical liberal contract law, opportunistic behavior is
permitted so long as it does not take the form of behaviors placed
within the unacceptable categories of fraud or duress. Within
classical liberal property law, questionable individual uses of
property are permitted so long as they do not take the form of
unacceptable behaviors placed in the category of nuisance.
More generally, certain kinds of marketized activity, such as sales
of products or services, are permitted and others are not. Automobiles
are permitted even though automobile deaths are inevitable and
substantial. The response to the harm takes the form of regulation that
conditions the production and use of automobiles to try to reduce the
harms—regulations to reduce the likelihood of dangerous defects in
the product and to increase the likelihood of safe usage of them
(licenses and speed limits). Similarly, the production and provision to
others of fattening food is permitted, although disease and death from
it is substantial. The response to the harm takes the form of regulation
requiring disclosure of nutritional value.
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The intensity and likelihood of the harm to others is one central
measure of assessment for regulating the market. As per classical
liberal utilitarianism, this harm is weighed against the potential
benefit of the activity.
Protecting individuals from harming themselves is a second mode
of justification for regulation. This kind of justification enjoys
ideological legitimacy of a more qualified sort. This kind of
regulatory intervention does not find its justification in classical
―negative‖ liberalism but rather in more paternalistic approaches that
both antedated and succeeded classical liberalism. The extent to
which such paternalistic measures are tolerated in part stems from the
societal acceptance of alternative forms of liberalism: classical
―positive‖ liberalism and postclassical Fordism.
These justifications are ideologically legitimate because they can
be expressed explicitly as the basis for regulatory intervention.
However, there are other justifications, which I call illegitimateideological, which are not expressed. These justifications are
―illiberal‖ because they turn away from the liberal idea of an
abstracted, universal self and an abstracted relationship between that
self and the state. Instead, they arise from particularistic social
identities. Preserving the geographical, cultural, racial, religious,
linguistic, and gender identity of the idealized nation-state fuels these
justifications. In other words, a threat to the idealized national
identity is a form of harm, and regulatory interventions in the market
may be motivated by the desire to control that harm.
Thus, where a product or service in the market is associated with a
nonideal identity, it may become the focus of regulation. These
illegitimate justifications may fuel both the impetus for regulation
and the form that regulation takes—regulatory impulses fueled by
illegitimate ideological justifications may tend towards prohibition
rather than conditional permission.
Prohibitionism has an additional and centrally important quality in
that it tends to reinforce the negative aspects of the prohibited activity
and thereby strengthens the justifications for prohibition. This
feedback loop is created by banishing the activity into the realm of
unregulated criminal enterprise. The activity is therefore unmitigated
by the kinds of harm-reducing regulations that are administered in a
conditional-permission mode, so that the potential harms from the
activity itself are at their maximum. Moreover, the harms that might
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arise from the activity itself are joined by auxiliary harms that arise
from the criminal mode of production, such as violence and extortion.
(These dynamics are discussed in more detail in Part V.)
Prohibition has a final quality, which is that it criminalizes the
supplying population. Where underlying economic and social
dynamics locate production within particular kinds of the population,
prohibition will extend the criminal identity of that population. This
is a second feedback loop that has to do not with the activity but with
the suppliers of the activity. The participation of a given population
in the act of supply may arise from an illegitimate ideological
justification that perceives that population as a threat to identity; the
criminalization of the activity produces criminality in this population
which enhances the basis for the justification. (This is discussed more
in Part V and Part VI.)
II. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN NORMAL
ACTIVITY IN LIBERAL REGIMES

AND

ABNORMAL MARKET

A. The Dichotomy
We have now established the need for justifications to mediate the
tension between the self-consciously liberal state and intervention in
the market. We have also established that these justifications
explicitly take the ideologically legitimate forms of preventing harm
to others, firstly, and preventing harm to oneself, more qualifiedly;
but the impetus for and result of these justifications may also be
influenced by less often expressed, and ideologically more
problematic, concerns related to perceived threats against the identity
of the nation-state.
The result of all of this is to create in a liberal regime a dichotomy
between “normal” market activity, which is subject to the ―normal‖
and less visible regulatory mode of supporting the market, and
“abnormal” market activity, which is subject to the abnormal and
more visible regulatory mode of prohibition.
Prohibiting the abnormal becomes the site of the expression of
both universalized and particularistic public identity as well as the
site of the visible, justified exercise of public power. The ―state‖ here
is not only the contractarian vision (Locke‘s and Mills‘) of a
protector of civil rights and liberties or the domain of civic
participation (Aristotle, Rousseau) but also the site of coercion and
violence (Hobbes, Nietzsche, Weber).
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―Power‖ here is coercion, but coercion is partially a product of
social consent (Gramsci, Foucault). Institutionally, this means that
power is exercised not only by the state ―on‖ society but also by
society, and actors and groups within society, ―on‖ the state.
―Governance‖ is the product of these interactions. Hence, regulation
is the result of combined activities of actors through the lever of the
state, influenced by and influencing the regulatory framework.
The market is the domain of exchange (Smith), an inherently
disruptive force (Marx), and the product of regularized and relatively
less visible coercion (Hale). The market is also a site for the
production of identity through regulation, by regulating in such a way
that sets up a dichotomy between normal and abnormal market
activities that pay allegiance to the ideal form (Tarullo).
Prohibitionist public-health regulations will seek to fend off and close
down the markets for illicit products and services, such as illegal
drugs, illegal labor, and illegal sex, although the market‘s own
dynamics do not differentiate between these and others.
Because the dynamics of supply, demand, exchange, and profit
themselves potentially apply everywhere, and because they produce
results that sometimes resemble but sometimes contradict it, the
maintenance of the normal and abnormal market is an ongoing,
uneasy affair.9
As a mélange of theories, this general analytical framework runs
the risk of pastiche, which is incoherence. Nevertheless, it seeks to
provide a persuasive conceptual account of why liberal states
criminalize—or perhaps a better term would be how, that is the
conceptual nature of the reasons that liberalism gives itself when it
turns to prohibition.
B. A Note on Methodology
This account is a dynamic one in that it envisions regulation as a
process of interaction between these actors. It shares this dynamic
orientation with ―functionalist‖ and ―legal process‖ accounts of the
9. Thus, antitrust regulations seek to preserve the ―ideal‖ ―normal‖ market,
although the market‘s own dynamics will tend to lead it towards monopoly;
antidumping trade regulations seek to preserve the ―ideal‖ ―normal‖ market,
although the market‘s own dynamics will tend to lead it towards ―dumping.‖ Daniel
K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 546, 549 (1987).
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mid-twentieth century and with ―governance‖ theory of the current
moment.
The approach to governance employed here is, however, a critical
one. The critique is animated by the following perspectives: (1) a
legal realist approach: that is, a focus on the background conditions
and distributional consequences of the framework; (2) a
poststructuralist approach: that is, a focus on the role of ideals and
discourses in addition to material conditions and institutions; and (3)
a progressive approach: that is, a desire to identify and resolve those
dynamics that structurally subordinate individuals and groups.
The analytical account is not only descriptive but also critical
along these lines, in that it attempts to expose within the
contemporary framework: (1) the ways in which the legal rules
ignore or inadequately take into account the background conditions
and distributional consequences of their operation; and (2) the ways
in which the legal rules ignore or inadequately take into account their
origin within and contribution to particularistic ideals and discourses
the ways in which the legal rules ignore or inadequately take into
account their structural subordination of individuals and groups.
The remainder of this Paper applies the foregoing analytic to the
issue of undocumented workers as a case study of fragmented legal
systems coexisting ―in the same social field.‖10
III. PLURAL LEGALITY IN
MIGRANT WORKERS

THE

SOCIAL FIELD

OF

UNAUTHORIZED

The array of international treaty systems actually or potentially
affecting undocumented migrant workers fits Merry‘s definition of
legal pluralism, in which one finds multiple legal orders not
belonging to the same system but addressing the same social reality.11
A. The “Liberal Egalitarian” Regimes of Trade and Human
Rights
1. Trade
The multilateral trading regime is anchored by the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the 1995 successor to the General Agreement
10. Merry, supra note 1, at 870.
11. In this version of the Paper, I do not attempt to incorporate an analysis of
regional treaties; this is the basis of ongoing research that will hopefully bear fruit
in the next version.
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For most of its history, the trade
regime dealt only with trade in goods, but with its expansion into the
WTO included new rules addressing cross-border transactions
involving flows of people.
The central principle of the World Trade Organization is
nondiscrimination, as embodied, inter alia, in the doctrine of
―national treatment,‖ which holds that national origin should not be a
basis for discrimination in market access. At the same time, of
course, there are many exceptions to this principle, and those
exceptions can largely be understood as the product of political
economy—they tend to represent areas in which government
representatives determine that some subset of interest groups
influencing state behavior wishes to continue policies of
discrimination on the basis of national origin.
In the trade regime‘s lingo, migrant labor is a sub-category of
―trade in services‖ and so falls within the scope of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) established in 1995. Since
the provision of services need not entail the movement of an actual
person across a national border, not all categories, or ―Modes,‖ of
GATS rules are relevant to our topic. The Mode that is most relevant
is ―Mode 4,‖ temporary movement of natural persons.12
The GATS is very limited in its potential to help undocumented
workers. First, GATS Mode 4 does not address manufacturing or
agriculture, excluding the very sectors which most commonly feature
undocumented workers.13 Second, this exclusion within Mode 4 is
accompanied by a de facto focus of the GATS, in its entire
orientation, on high-skilled service sectors such as accounting and
financial services. Third, the Annex to the GATS covering
Movement of Natural Persons (Annex) does not provide any
authorization for a worker to enter a country14 but stipulates only
12. ―Trade in services‖ is defined as ―the supply of a service by a service
supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the
territory of any other Member.‖ General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex on
Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 185, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1187 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
13. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Service Providers on the Move: A
Closer Look at Labor Mobility and the GATS, TD/TC/WP(2001)26/FINAL (Feb.
20, 2002) [hereinafter OECD 2002].
14. GATS, supra note 12, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying
Services Under the Agreement [Annex on Movement of Natural Persons], para. 2,
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certain constraints (such as nondiscrimination and national treatment)
once that authorized worker does enter.
WTO members are currently engaged in the ―Doha‖ Round of
Negotiations, launched by the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference and
accompanying Ministerial Declaration (the Doha Declaration) setting
forth goals for negotiations. For the first time ever, the WTO is
fielding serious proposals by member states to include negotiations
on low-skilled labor migration.
The Doha Declaration states that ―negotiations on trade in services
shall be conducted with a view to promoting the economic growth of
all trading partners and the development of developing and leastdeveloped countries.‖15 The negotiations on trade in services are
expected to form an important part of the results for the Doha round.
The Declaration calls for a focus on rules governing movement of
natural persons and the effect of those rules on prospects for
development.
Developing-country members of the WTO are increasingly
concerned with addressing low-skilled labor migration head on,
particularly since many are significant exporters of such labor.
Several countries have offered proposals that would elaborate rules
on the movement of natural persons, and some of these proposals
directly link movement of natural persons with development. 16
Perhaps the boldest call, however, has come from the United Nations
Development Programme, which has urged the negotiation of WTO

reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1127 (―[T]he Agreement shall not apply to measures
affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member,
nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a
permanent basis.‖).
15. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
16. See Communication from India, Proposed Liberalization of Movement of
Professionals under General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), S/CSS/W/12
(Nov. 24, 2000); Communication from United States, Movement of Natural
Persons, S/CSS/W/29 (Dec. 18 2000); Communication from Japan, Movement of
Natural Persons, S/CSS/W/42/Suppl.2 (July 6, 2001); Communication from EC,
GATS 2000: Temporary Movement of Service Suppliers, S/CSS/W/45 (March 14,
2001); Communication from Canada, Initial Negotiating Proposal on Temporary
Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the GATS (Mode 4),
S/CSS/W/48, (March 14, 2001); Communication from Colombia, Proposal for
Negotiations on the Provision of Services Through Movement of Natural Persons,
S/CSS/W/97 (July 9, 2001).
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rules liberalizing constraints on low-skilled labor migration.17
There have been some negotiations regarding the creation of a
basis for easier authorization of workers who fall into the GATS
categories. The so-called GATS visa has been promoted by the
Indian government as well as U.S. and European businesses.18 This
would effectively amend the Annex. However, even were the GATS
visa to be negotiated, it would not be likely to aid the most vulnerable
populations because of the limitations stated above. GATS Mode 4
has been characterized by low levels of participation by WTO
Members, so it is unlikely to expand to transcend the limitations
stated above.19
2. Human Rights
If international trade law leaves undocumented migrant workers
without recourse, what does international human rights law offer?
Does the human rights framework provide some basis on which
illegal migrants, by virtue of their humanity, might enjoy rights?
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)20 defines the principle of nondiscrimination in this way:
Each State Party undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.21

17. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME & KAMAL MOHOTRA,
MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE 274–75 (2003).
18. Richard Self & B. K. Zutshi, Temporary Entry of Natural Persons as
Service Providers: Issues and Challenges in Further Liberalization Under the
Current GATS Negotiations, at 25 (2002), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ser
v_e/symp_apr_02_zutshi_self_e.doc.
19. OECD 2002, supra note 13, at 6. Although regional systems are not
addressed in this Paper, many of them—with the exception of the EU policy of free
movement of persons with EU citizenship—have a similar effect. The NAFTA
streamlines some entry requirements for skilled professionals. South-South regional
agreements, such as the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement and the African
Economic Community, do not mention services or migrant labor at all.
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S.
No. 14668, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
21. Id. art. 2(1). Moreover, the ICCPR grants an effective remedy for ―any
person whose rights and freedoms as herein recognized are violated. Id. art. 2(2).
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The italicized language suggests that migrant workers, even if
undocumented, should be able to exercise rights equal to any other
person in a State Party‘s territory.
A General Comment on the Position of Aliens Under the Covenant
seeks to draw attention to this language.22 The Comment states that:
[T]he general rule is that each one of the rights of the
Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens. . . . However, the Committee‘s experience
in examining reports shows that in a number of countries . . .
rights that aliens should enjoy under the Covenant are denied
to them or are subject to limitations that cannot always be
justified under the Covenant.23
Is such commentary intended to establish a right of entry for
migrant workers? The Committee hastened to qualify its
interpretation by stating that the treaty ―does not recognize the right
of aliens to enter or to reside in the territory of a State party. It is in
principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its
territory.‖24
At the same time, the Committee indicated ―in certain
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant
even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when
considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman
treatment and respect for family life arise.‖25 What the precise nature
of such circumstances would be, however, remained unspecified.
Thus, the overarching nature of the nondiscrimination principle in
the ICCPR seems to give the state the right to say who can come in
and who has to go, but once the alien is within, the territory cannot
discriminate. Although the question of lawful status is not explicitly
mentioned here, one can surmise that its omission is intentional.
22. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No.
15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, para. 1 (November 4, 1986)
(―Reports from States parties have often failed to take into account that each State
party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to ‗all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction‘ (art. 2, para. 1). In general, the rights set forth in the
Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or
her nationality or statelessness.‖).
23. Id. para. 2.
24. Id. para 5. (emphasis added).
25. Id.
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This inference becomes stronger when one considers another part
of the General Comment which states that, ―[o]nce an alien is
lawfully within a territory, his freedom of movement within the
territory and his right to leave that territory may only be restricted in
accordance with article 12(3).‖26 Since this is the only place where
lawful status is explicitly mentioned, one can be even more confident
in interpreting the lack of explicit mention as intentional. This would
support the application of the nondiscrimination principle regardless
of lawful status. The familiar canon of legal interpreation, exclusio
unio inclusio alterius, can be applied to conclude that the fact that
lawful status is mentioned here but not elsewhere suggests that, with
respect to the other principles, lawful status is not a basis for
distinction.
What about specific rights of particular interest to migrant
workers, such as the right to organize? The ICCPR establishes that
―[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of interests.‖27 At the same time, this right is subject to
―restrictions . . . prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.‖28 Whether such restrictions would
include those distinguishing documented from undocumented
workers, notwithstanding the General Comment discussed above, has
not been explicitly addressed.
Whether established international human rights law confers such
rights as nondiscrimination and freedom of association on migrant
workers, and on what basis, is a question that also requires
examination of the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (the
Migrant Workers Convention).29 The Convention entered into force
in December 2002 after receiving the last ratification necessary for its
entry into force thirteen years after its initial adoption as a Resolution
of the United Nations General Assembly in 1990.
26. Id. para. 8.
27. ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 22(1).
28. Id. art. 22(2).
29. International Covenant on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93.
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Article 1 of the Migrant Workers Convention provides that the
right against discrimination ―shall apply during the entire migration
process of migrant workers and their families, which comprises
preparation for migration, departure, transit and the entire period of
stay and remunerated activity . . . as well as return . . . .‖30
Unlike the trade regime, this rule of nondiscrimination is not
limited to particular sectors listed by state parties but rather applies to
any person ―who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in
a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national.‖31 Moreover, although the Convention distinguishes
between ―documented‖ and ―non-documented‖ workers elsewhere,
such distinction is not present either in this article, its
nondiscrimination article,32 or its article establishing the right to form
and join trade unions.33 The inference that these principles should not
turn on document status is particularly strengthened by the fact that
the Convention contains a separate section on the rights of
―documented‖ migrant workers and their families.34
Thus, international human rights law could be argued to extend to
illegal migrant workers principles perceived as foundational to the
human rights system. As such, international human rights law
extends liberal egalitarianism further than international trade law,
although how far depends on interpretive questions that have yet to
be resolved. At the same time, multilateral human rights enforcement
is ineffective in terms of the provision of recourse for individual
claimants.35
Predating human rights treaties are the treaties of the International
Labor Organization, which include the Convention on the Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize36 and the
30. Id. art. 1(2).
31. Id. art. 2(1). This includes ―frontier worker,‖ ―seasonal worker,‖ ―seafarer,‖
―worker in an offshore installation,‖ ―itinerant worker,‖ ―project-tied worker,‖
―specified employment worker,‖ and ―self-employed worker.‖ Id. art. 2(2).
32. Id. art. 7.
33. Id. art. 26.
34. Id. arts. 36–56.
35. Regional human rights systems may harbor more potential. See Connie de la
Vega & Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use Applicable International
Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented Migrant Workers‟ Rights in the
United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 35 (2005) (describing the InterAmerican human rights system).
36. International Labour Organization, Freedom of Association and Protection
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Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining. 37
Article 2 of the Freedom of Association Convention provides that the
Convention applies, on its own terms, ―without distinction
whatsoever‖; and Article 1 of the Collective Bargaining Convention
requires ―adequate protection against acts of anti-union
discrimination.‖ Thus, international labor law would also appear to
be a basis for extending basic civil and political individual rights to
migrant workers. Although the International Labour Organization
(the ILO) does have a Committee which undertakes fact-finding and
reporting, it too does little in the way of enforcement. (The ILO
process will be taken up again in Part III, below.)
B. The Prohibitionist Regime: Criminal Laws
In 2000, the international criminal law against illegal markets
expanded dramatically with the establishment and rapid entry into
force of a new complex of multilateral agreements negotiated at
Palermo under the auspices of the Vienna-based UN Office on Drugs
and Crime Control: the Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime (the Organized Crime Convention)38 and two Protocols, the
Migrant Smuggling Protocol39 and the Trafficking in Persons
Protocol40 (collectively, the Crime Conventions). Together with the
already-existing Drug Convention,41 the overall goal is to harmonize
states‘ prohibition and prosecution of illicit market transactions.
These multilateral policing efforts contain both substantive and
institutional dimensions. Substantively, the agreements establish
harmonized definitions of criminal offenses relating to ―core‖ illicit
of the Right to Organize Convention, Gen. Conf. No. 87 (July 9, 1948).
37. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning the Application
of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, Gen. Conf.
No. 98 (June 8, 1949).
38. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov.
15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter Organized
Crime Convention].
39. U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol Against the Smuggling by Land, Sea and
Air, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
Annex III; UN Doc. A/55/383 (2000) [hereinafter Migrant Smuggling Protocol].
40. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16, 2237 U.N.T.S.
319 [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol].
41. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, SEN. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-4, 1582 U.N.T.S. 165
[hereinafter Drug Convention].
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markets. The Drug Convention requires member states to criminalize
manufacturing, sale, transport, and possession of narcotics as well as
related profit;42 the Organized Crime Convention requires member
states to criminalize participation in a criminal group, money
laundering, corruption of public officials, and obstruction of justice;43
the Migrant Smuggling Protocol requires member states to
criminalize the transport of migrants without valid travel
documentation and related uses of fraudulent travel documents; 44 and
the Trafficking Protocol requires member states to criminalize the
―trafficking of persons‖ as defined in the Protocol.45
42. See id. art. 3 (establishing as a criminal offense the ―production,
manufacture, . . . offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery . . . , . . . transport,
importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance‖; the
―conversion or transfer‖ or the ―acquisition, possession or use‖ of property,
knowing that it is derived; and aiding or abetting in any of the foregoing).
43. Organized Crime Convention, supra note 38, art. 5 (establishing as an
offense the act of ―[a]greeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious
crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or
other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act
undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving
an organized criminal group‖; the ―action‖ requirement is a consequence of the
nonrecognition of the crime of conspiracy in the civil law system); Id. art. 6
(establishing as an offense the ―conversion or transfer of property, knowing that
such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising
the illicit origin of the property‖); Id. art. 8 (establishing as an offense the ―promise,
offering or giving to a public official‖ or ―solicitation or acceptance by a public
official,‖ ―directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties‖); Id. art. 23 (establishing as a
criminal offense, when committed intentionally, ―the use of physical force, threats
or intimidation or the . . . offering . . . of an undue advantage to induce false
testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence‖
or otherwise ―to interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law
enforcement official‖ in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences
covered by this Convention‖).
44. Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 39, art. 6 (establishing as a
criminal offense, ―when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit,‖ smuggling of migrants, or
producing, providing, procuring or possessing a fraudulent travel or identity
document when such acts ―committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of
migrants‖).
45. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 5. The Trafficking Protocol requires
criminalization of trafficking, defined as: ―the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
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Institutionally, the agreements give fairly detailed guidelines46 for
the coordination of law enforcement among member states in
combating these criminal offenses.47 If a state party refuses the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs.‖ Id. art. 3. The Trafficking Protocol specifies that ―the consent of a victim
of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation [as defined in the Protocol]
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in [the Protocol] have been
used.‖ Id. art. 3(b).
The definition of trafficking in the Protocol has been very controversial,
particularly within communities of feminist theorists and women‘s rights
advocates. See generally Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal
Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses: Four
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 336
(2006).
46. There is also a more general obligation to cooperate. See Organized Crime
Convention, supra note 38, art. 27 (―States Parties shall cooperate closely with one
another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative
systems,‖ especially in aid of conducting inquiries regarding identity of persons or
property related to crimes; and general exchange of information.). The Drug and
Crime Conventions, for example, have established progressively more extensive
obligations relating to extradition. For an account of this progression towards
―thick‖ institutional obligations, see Chantal Thomas, Disciplining Globalization:
International Law, Illegal Trade, and the Case of Narcotics, 24 MICH. J. INT‘L L.
549, 570–71 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (―The 1961 Convention said
relatively little about the institutional mechanics of punishing illicit trade, but it did
establish basic standards for extradition of offenders. . . . The 2000 Convention
expanded the bases for extradition to include not only those acts defined as offenses
under the treaty, but also any other act involving an ‗organized criminal group‘ that
constituted an offense in both countries. The 1988 and 2000 Conventions
developed additional mechanisms to increase efficacy in criminal enforcement.
Both conventions progressively expanded subject matter jurisdiction. They also
multiplied the bases for confiscation of narcotics materials and instruments. Each
convention also contributed unique techniques to the enforcement arsenal. The
1988 Convention allowed for and encouraged eradication of illicit crops. The 2000
[Organized Crime] Convention allows Member States to use ‗special investigative
techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover
operations‘ to aid enforcement. The 2000 Convention also requires members to
‗institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks
and non-bank financial institutions . . . in order to deter and detect all forms of
money laundering.‖).
47. The conventions also require member states to meet some
institutionalization requirements vis-à-vis purely domestic enforcement, but these
appear to be designed to establish a baseline conducive to intergovernmental
cooperation with law enforcement authorities from other states. For example, a
state party to the Organized Crime Convention must ensure a minimum domestic
criminal law environment by establishing formal sanctions for the Convention‘s
defined criminal offenses. See Organized Crime Convention, supra note 38, art. 11
(Members ―must establish sanctions to punish conspiracy/involvement, laundering,
corruption and obstruction of justice‖; ―[e]ach State Party shall make the
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request of another state party to extradite an individual, it becomes
subject to an obligation to prosecute that individual internally.48 There
are also extensive provisions regarding ―mutual legal assistance‖
during the stages of criminal investigation that antecede formal
indictment and extradition.49 In addition, the conventions establish
bases for coordinating the policing of borders against illegal
migrants50 by allowing states to extend immigration-related
investigations extraterritorially into commercial carriers under the
control or auspices of other state parties.51 Both ―smuggled migrants‖
commission of an offence [of organized crime, money laundering, corruption, and
obstruction of justice] . . . liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of
that offence.‖) Further guidance related to specific penalties and techniques is
hortatory rather than mandatory. Id. art. 12 (noting on confiscation that ―States
Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal
systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation‖); id. art. 20
(noting on surveillance that ―[i]f permitted by the basic principles of its domestic
legal system, each State Party shall, within its possibilities and under the conditions
prescribed by its domestic law, take the necessary measures to allow for the
appropriate use of controlled delivery and, where it deems appropriate, for the use
of other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of
surveillance and undercover operations‖); id. art. 28 (noting on cooperation with
law enforcement that ―[e]ach State Party shall take appropriate measures to
encourage persons who participate or who have participated in organized criminal
groups: (a) To supply information useful to competent authorities for investigative
and evidentiary purposes . . .‖).
Note that States Parties must make criminal such offenses not only when they
involve a transnational component but also even if they are wholly domestic. Id.
art. 34 (―The offences [on conspiracy or other ‗participation in an organized
criminal group,‘ laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice] . . . shall be
established in the domestic law of each State Party independently of the
transnational nature‖ of the activity.).
48. See id. art. 16(10) (―A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is
found, if it does not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this
article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the
request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case
without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.‖).
49. See id. art. 18 (defining mutual legal assistance as taking evidence or
statements from persons; effecting service of judicial documents; executing
searches and seizures, and freezing; examining objects and sites; and providing
information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations).
50. See Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 39, art. 11(1) (―Without
prejudice to international commitments in relation to the free movement of people,
States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent possible, such border controls as may
be necessary to prevent and detect the smuggling of migrants.‖).
51. Id. art. 11. See also Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 11 (extending
obligation to strengthen border controls to ―commercial carriers‖ by requiring
―commercial carriers . . . to ascertain that all passengers are in possession of the
travel documents required for entry into the receiving State‖); id. art. 8
(encouragement of cooperation with investigation of sea vessels).
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and ―trafficked persons‖52 can be returned home by the ―receiving‖
state party, and both must be accepted by the ―sending‖ state party.53
C. Comparison with Trade and Human Rights Regimes
The international criminal law regime appears quite robust when
compared with its rather feebler counterparts in trade and human
rights. Despite the relative strength of the WTO generally, the
existing subdivision governing trade in services is much less
effectual. This is because, as indicated above, in services the basic
WTO disciplines of nondiscrimination and national treatment apply
only to those sectors that are voluntarily made subject to them—this
contrasts with the rules governing trade in goods or intellectual
property, where these principles automatically apply.54 And within
the relatively weak division of trade in services, those provisions
governing migrant (temporary) labor are the weakest and most
qualified. Substantively, the rules formally exclude unauthorized
labor from their purview, as well as those sectors in which
undocumented migrant workers are likely to work. The practical
effect of the trade regime is to confer the privileges of liberalization
only to high-skilled workers.
The human rights regime as it applies to undocumented migrant
workers would appear to offer, in terms of its substantive content,
some form of protection to unauthorized migrants, and in that sense it
is stronger than the trade rules. However, the Migrant Workers
Convention is hampered by a lack of signatories. The ICCPR,
although it has more signatories and so could presumably be used to
52. The conceptual distinction between ―smuggled migrants‖ and ―trafficked
persons‖ rests on voluntariness: the smuggled migrant is said to have consented to
being transported illegally, whereas the trafficked person has encountered fraud,
force, or some other mode of coercion. In practice, this distinction can be very hard
to maintain. Conceptually, this distinction reflects a deep ambivalence in sociolegal commitments to contract and market as regulatory tools.
53. See, e.g., Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 39, art. 18(1) (―Each
State Party agrees to facilitate and accept, without undue or unreasonable delay, the
return of a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this
Protocol and who is its national or who has the right of permanent residence in its
territory at the time of return.‖); Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 8(1) (―The
State Party of which a victim of trafficking in persons is a national or in which the
person had the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of
the receiving State Party shall facilitate and accept, with due regard for the safety of
that person, the return of that person without undue or unreasonable delay.‖).
54. The Doha round includes an effort to expand the commitments under trade
in services; since it is subject to controversy, it is uncertain how this will turn out.
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reinforce the principle of protecting the human rights of
undocumented migrant workers, is limited in its ability to offer any
recourse to right-holders. In addition, signatories like the United
States would argue, albeit not without controversy, that their
reservations to the treaty restrict potential right-holders to that
recourse offered under domestic constitutional law.55 That recourse,
as shall be discussed below, has been spotty and seems to be
shrinking over time.
The international criminal law treaties have many more
participating members than the Migrant Workers Convention or the
GATS.56 Moreover, unlike either of these two conventions, the
international criminal law treaties contain a great deal of
administrative obligations—specifications as to how state parties
should go about implementing the treaty‘s provisions. The apparatus
established by these conventions is thus much broader in its purview
and authority.
In terms of enforcement, the international criminal law treaties do
not feature the type of dispute settlement mechanism found in the
WTO. In that sense, they could be argued to suffer from the same
form of institutional frailty that typifies most public international law
instruments. At the same time, however, the multilateral agreements
are supplemented by a wide variety of regional, bilateral, and
unilateral practices, typically spearheaded by ―receiving‖ countries.
The United States, for example, provides extensive aid, funding, and
military training to Latin America to combat the drug trade. 57 The
55. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4, 781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2. 1992) (setting forth Senate
reservations to the ICCPR). For challenges to the validity of reservations, see
generally Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning
“Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515
(1991); David Weissbrodt, The United States Ratification of Human Rights
Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 (1978).
56. Although all WTO Members are formally signatories to the GATS, the fact
that GATS principles apply only to those sectors for which members have actively
made concessions, and the fact that only a minority of members have made such
concessions, effectively means the level of participation is low. See OECD 2002,
supra note 13, at 30 (stating that the ―the ratio of full liberalization in Mode 4
market access ranges from 0 to 4%, compared with 18–59% in Mode 1 (crossborder, such as e-commerce), 24–69% in Mode 2 (consumption abroad, such as
foreign outpatients), and 0–31% in Mode 3 (commercial presence, such as foreign
subsidiaries‖)).
57. Examples include Plan Colombia, providing U.S. assistance to Colombia,
and the Andean Pact, providing trade and aid programs to Colombia, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru. See Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical
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European Union‘s Department of Justice and Home Affairs maintains
extensive working relationships with Europol, the Task Force of EU
Police Chiefs, the European Police College (CEPOL), Interpol, and
the Council of Europe.58
Thus, as a normative matter, the international criminal law treaties
seem to be operating to justify and reinforce efforts by Northern
―receiving‖ states to strengthen not only their internal prosecutions of
illegal transactions but also their pursuit of strong cooperative
mechanisms with Southern ―supplier‖ states. The most salient
example, but far from the only one, is the U.S. Department of State‘s
system of categorizing governments according to the efforts they
have made to combat trafficking in persons. Countries are placed on
one of four ―tiers‖ according to the level of effort they have made in
this vein. The Department of State is authorized to withhold foreign
aid from those recipient governments that have not made sufficient
efforts. The kinds of efforts that are viewed most favorably are those
that strengthen the police and prosecutorial functions of the
government. This watch list has proven enormously successful; so
much so that even governments that neither receive nor require U.S.
foreign aid, such as Japan, have hastened to change their practices to
counter the reputational cost of an adverse assessment.59
The Trafficking Protocol, of course, has at its center the goal of
reducing the suffering of victims of ―modern-day slavery.‖ To that
end, the Protocol does contain language promoting the protection of
Assistance in Defense and Security Between the Governments of the United States
of America and the Republic of Columbia art. 3(1), Mar. 11, 2009, Temp. State
Dept. No. 09-200, Hein‘s No. KAV 8780, available at http://www.state.gov/docum
ents/organization/131654.pdf; Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting a
Report Concerning a Review of the Performance of Bolivia and Ecuador as Set
Forth in the Andean Trade Preference Act, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc., 2009 DCPD
No. 00525 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM136_0
91112_bho_letter.html.
58. These activities are coordinated through Directorate D of the DirectorateGeneral for Justice, Freedom and Security. The mandate for the EU‘s regional and
supranational initiatives arises from the objective that the European Union be an
―area of freedom, security and justice.‖ Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community art. 1(3), Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3 (Treaty of Amsterdam). See also Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community arts. 17–22, 39–47, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4 (Treaty
of Rome).
59. See generally Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using
Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 437
(2006).
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human rights of trafficking victims. However, whereas the Protocol‘s
language relating to criminalization and repatriation establishes
mandatory obligations, the provisions relating to assistance of victims
and human rights protection are aspirational.60
Again, to look at the actions of the U.S. government, this apparent
emphasis on criminal prosecution over victim assistance is reflected.
For example, the U.S. anti-trafficking statute enacted
contemporaneously with the Protocol provides that persons who have
been trafficked into the United States might be able to benefit from a
special visa created for them (the T visa), which would allow them to
avoid returning to the presumably dangerous circumstances that
caused them to be trafficked in the first place. However, despite the
Department of State‘s estimate that up to twenty to fifty thousand
people are trafficked into the U.S. annually, the statute allows for
only five thousand of these visas to be conferred annually. Of the
allowed visas, only a fraction are actually issued.61 Finally, even in
this victim-assistance mode, criminal prosecution is paramount: the
visa is conditional upon the victim‘s certified cooperation with police
authorities—activity that could arguably increase the vulnerability of
the victim, or the victim‘s family or loved ones, to retaliation by the
traffickers.62
Finally, although the scope of ―trafficking in persons‖
definitionally includes a wide range of forced labor situations, in
practice the discourse around trafficking has focused on combating
and abolishing prostitution.63 In the U.S. context, the Bush
Administration explicitly included the criminalization of prostitution
among its conditions for foreign assistance. Efforts by legal services
and NGOs in the U.S. seeking to protect migrant workers in, for
60. Compare Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 5 (on criminalization:
states ―shall . . . establish . . . criminal offenses.‖), art. 8 (on repatriation: states
―shall facilitate and accept . . . the return of [a victim of trafficking].‖), with id. art.
6 (on the establishment of social services programs: states ―shall consider
implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social
recovery of victims.‖), art. 7 (on the status of victims: states ―shall consider
adopting . . . measures that permit victims of trafficking . . . to remain in . . .
territory.‖).
61. See, e.g., U.S. STATE DEP‘T., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS (2004).
62. See generally Thomas et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist
Legal Responses, supra note 2.
63. See supra, note 45.
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example, agricultural or domestic labor have so far been unable to tap
into the protections offered by the anti-trafficking statute.64
IV. THE SYMBOLIC AND NORMATIVE ORDERING EFFECTS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

OF

Beyond its specific institutional authoritativeness, international
criminal law against illegal markets, by criminalizing the suppliers,
has the effect of throwing a shadow of suspicion over entire regions
of the world that are viewed thereafter as suppliers of criminality.
The atmosphere of fear and paranoia in developed countries
against those lawless wilds outside their borders both enables and is
enhanced by the expansion of the prohibitionist regime. Certainly, in
a post-9/11 world in which major political powers have declared an
ongoing state of heightened alert, the social atmosphere may be one
in which popular concerns in developed countries around increased
economic instability in the globalization era very easily dovetail with
increases in perceived criminal dangers beyond borders.
Thus, globalization seems to be twinned with increasing border
paranoia. That such sentiments concretely affect international affairs
was reflected, for example, in remarks given by Jan Eliasson, the
President of the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, calling for ―a strong effort for international openness‖
despite the perceived dangers of globalization:
The free movement of people, ideas—and merchandise, of
course—is important and has contributed enormously to the
positive change in the recent decade. But if that outside world
also, to many, is seen as a threat, the political forces are
64. For example, legal services organizations in Central Texas were attempting
to get T visas and other protections for undocumented Mexican workers who had
been recruited to work in construction and hotels by employers who then had not
paid them, knowing that the workers would likely be unable to seek any recourse
against them. See, e.g., Thomas et al., From the International to the Local in
Feminist Legal Responses, supra note 2, at 390–91(―These advocates describe such
practices as enslavement because workers are not compensated for their labor.
Moreover, employers take advantage of the vulnerability these workers suffer as a
result of their undocumented status. So far, under State Department rules, if the
employer simply chooses not to pay workers without threatening to turn them into
immigration authorities, he is not considered to be ―trafficking.‖). Since such labor
involved deception and was unpaid, these lawyers thought the workers could fairly
be described to be victims of trafficking. These efforts have so far been
unsuccessful.
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fishing in murky waters and looking at migration and crime
and so forth coming from that dangerous outside, then we are
in trouble.65
Some commentators have argued that moral panics, border
paranoia, and other political anxieties that fuel national and
international prohibitionist efforts stem from unconscious, deeply
rooted, symbolic dynamics tying national identity to the physical
body. Territorial integrity is associated with bodily integrity in this
symbolic order. Openness to and presence of aliens contaminates the
national body.66
This discursive framework has perhaps most forcefully been
articulated as ―biopower.‖ According to this concept, the symbology
of the state as a body fuels ―the explosion of numerous and diverse
techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of
populations.‖67 In this way, the crime conventions‘ harmonization and
coordination of criminal enforcement, extension of techniques such
65. H.E. Jan Eliasson, Speech to Carnegie Council as Part of ―A Fairer
Globalization‖ Series, The Progress of UN Reform (June 7, 2006) (transcript on
file with the Maryland Journal of International Law) (emphasis added).
66. For an exposition on this social dynamic in the U.S. in particular and
especially during the period in which U.S. expansion overseas fueled anxiety about
its cultural and political integrity, see generally AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF
EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE (2005). One of Kaplan‘s case studies is
Downes v. Bidwell, the Supreme Court decision where, in a concurring opinion,
three justices described Puerto Rico as ―foreign in a domestic sense‖ under U.S.
law, so that the territory neither could demand sovereignty nor was subject to
federal laws that were not expressly extended to it by the U.S. Congress. See
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 320 (1901) (White, J., Shiras, J. & McKenna, J.,
concurring). For a critique of this position, see id. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (―[T]he contention seems to be that, if an organized and settled
province of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has the
power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous
existence for an indefinite period. . . . Great stress is thrown upon the word
„incorporation,‟ as if possessed of some occult meaning.‖). Though it did not
prevail in the particular case, the dissent‘s language in the Wong Kim Ark case must
be read to be indicative of some goodly proportion of public sentiment: ―There
should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that would be sacred
from the foul and corrupting taint of a debased alienage.‖ United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675 (1898) (Fuller, J. & Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in
Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of Constitutional
Law, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 121 (Christina D. Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
67. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 140 (1992). See also
GLOBALIZATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION: GOVERNMENTALITY, LAW AND IDENTITY
(Richard Warren Perry & Bill Maurer eds., 2003).
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as extradition and information-sharing among states, and assurance of
the repatriation of offending migrant bodies can all be seen as
instances of biopower.
The post-2001 tightening of connections between illegal markets
and terrorism perhaps represents a further extension of this
phenomenon. In this imaginary, every migrant entrant—and
particularly those who are unauthorized—potentially harbors drugs,
criminal organizational intentions, connections with prostitution, and
ultimately connections with terrorism. The supranational integration
of efforts to combat against such threats, in this line of thinking,
unifies the ―discourse of terrorism‖ with the ―discourse of
globalization.‖68 In this ―biopolitical‖ order, ―the ‗enemy‘ is
simultaneously ‗banalized‘ (reduced to an object of routine police
repression) and absolutized (as the Enemy, an absolute threat to the
ethical order).‖69
The effort to combat trafficking, in my view, both assuages the
conscience of the would-be prosecutor and adds to the general alarm
and atmosphere of anxiety that further enables the expansion of the
police power through the creation of a ―moral panic.‖70 The
conceptual unification of trafficking with prostitution, viewed in this
light, can be seen as a particular and essential component in the
growth of biopower. Sex contaminates the female body, and the
contaminated female body in turn corrupts the social body.71 Hence,
cross-border prostitution invokes the notion of a contaminant on
many different levels.72
The social reaction takes the form of a strong movement to repel
68. WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE SHAPE OF THE SIGNIFIER: 1967 TO THE END
OF HISTORY 224 (2004).
69. Id. at 224 (quoting MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 6 (2000)).

70. See Thomas, supra note 46.
71. For treatments of the relationship between the body, sexuality, and ―border
phenomena,‖ see Siobhan Somerville, Scientific Racism and the Invention of the
Homosexual Body, in THE GENDER/SEXUALITY READER 37 (Micaela di Leonardi &
Roger Lancaster eds., 1997); Abdul R. JanMohamed, Sexuality on/of the Racial
Border: Foucault, Wright and the Articulation of Racialized Sexuality, in
DISCOURSES OF SEXUALITY: FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIDS 94 (Donna Stanton ed.,
1992 ); ANN STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE (1995); Biddy Martin
& Chandra Mohanty, Feminist Politics: What Does Home Have To Do With It?, in
FEMINIST STUDIES, CRITICAL STUDIES 191 (Teresa de Laurentis ed., 1986).
72. ―Disgust concerns the borders of the body: it focuses on the prospect that a
problematic substance may be incorporated into the self.‖ MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW 88 (2004).
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the contaminant. An historical review of anti-prostitution campaigns
in the United States, for example, demonstrates that crackdowns have
often arisen in social contexts that also featured anxiety about
increased immigration.73 This explains why, although the putative
focus is the assistance of the victims of trafficking, the actual
responses are in the vein of criminal enforcement and bordertightening.74 This disparity between the punitive elements of the legal
73. First, the cross-border procurement of prostitution was criminalized both
nationally and internationally. The 1910 Mann Act provided that ―[a]ny person
who shall knowingly transport, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in
transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose or with the
intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a
prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral
practice . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment of not more than
five years, or by both.‖ White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825
(1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2006)).
The 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act establishes a criminal sentence for
―severe forms of trafficking in persons,‖ which is defined to mean ―(A) sex
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or
in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age;‖
or ―(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.‖
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2006)).
The Trafficking Protocol also calls for the establishment of criminal offences for
the ―trafficking of persons,‖ which is defined to mean:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 40, art. 5. Second, provisions were made for
the ―victims‖ to be repatriated to their home countries. Id. art. 8. See also Kerry
Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005) (showing how immigration panics were influenced by
the perception of widespread prostitution by immigrant women from China).
74. Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response
to Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 1, 16, 32 (2004) (noting that, although
trafficking can be addressed through a human rights framework, a labor framework,
or a law enforcement framework, ―[a]ll of the international documents addressing
human trafficking in detail have essentially embodied a law enforcement
perspective,‖ and ―the law enforcement framework has dominated the international

THOMAS MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

5/27/2010 2:56 PM

215

response and the victim-assistance elements is consistent with an
explanation of the law as primarily serving the ends, first, of building
state power and, second, of assuaging cultural concerns about social
identity.
The ―constructivist‖ approach in international relations theory also
offers an explanation linking these symbolic dynamics within states
to the incentives affecting the coordination of state behavior. The
constructivist approach to international relations would view those
political and social fault lines not only as part of the explanation but
as central and would investigate the ways in which ideas and cultures
shape states‘ perceptions of their own interests. Constructivist
theorists argue that ideas influence political behavior in a variety of
ways, including serving as road maps in the face of uncertainty.75
Employing the constructivist approach, the operative concept here
is of social identity as an in-group versus out-group phenomenon.
Beyond the liberal notion of individual human flourishing is Carl
Schmitt‘s idea of fear as a ruling political emotion—―all political
actions and motives can be reduced to the distinction between friend
and enemy.‖76 This distinction becomes symbolically charged at the
border.
V. PROHIBITIONISM PROBABLY MAKES ILLEGAL MARKETS MORE
DANGEROUS
The normative ordering described above could be perceived by
some as a legitimate—if controversial—corollary of the sociolegal
facts of national identity, territorial sovereignty, and citizenship.
However, the social benefits of policing identity must be considered
in light of the probable social costs, which include the ironic, or
tragic, likelihood that criminalizing markets in many cases probably
does not decrease them but only renders them more violent. In this
sense, the criminalization process turns into self-fulfilling prophecy:
illegal markets are viewed as threats, fueling a crackdown which
actually has the effect of amplifying the threat posed by said markets.
The logic behind the likely futility of prohibitionism is
response to human trafficking . . .‖).
75. See generally IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
76. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans.,
1976).
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fundamentally economic, stemming from the material conditions that
produce and shape illicit transactions. In this section, I will discuss
two arguments from economics that predict that prohibitionism
exacerbates rather than reduces market criminality. In the context of
undocumented migrant workers, this means that the incidence of
illegal migration will not likely reduce in response to crackdowns but
will likely become more dangerous for the migrants themselves and
for society in general.
The first argument is that illegal markets are deeply rooted in the
dynamics of globalization: ―push‖ and ―pull‖ factors that
criminalization will not affect. The second argument is that
criminalization, though it will not necessarily reduce the level of
illicit market activity in a significant way, will tend to shift the type
of suppliers from a decentralized to a centralized one, thereby
encouraging the growth of organized crime.
A. “Push” and “Pull” Dynamics of Globalization
The robustness of illicit markets arises out of three variables: deep
demand, deep supply, and the capacity to connect the two in a global
marketplace.
The demand in industrialized ―receiving countries‖ for the illicit
goods and services provided by developing countries and targeted by
the Crime Conventions is extensive. Demand for illicit narcotics has
not declined despite the decades-old War on Drugs.77 Employer
demand for undocumented labor is all but an open secret in the
U.S.,78 where undocumented migrant farm workers hired seasonally
in the U.S. outnumber those workers who are legally admitted.79 U.S.
77. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2006 WORLD DRUG REPORT, at 33, U.N.
Sales No. E.06.XI.10 (2006) (asserting that world drug consumption has ―remained
stable‖ but warning that recent changes in methodology may account for the lack of
increase).
78. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Dunne, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration
Policy, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 626–27 (2000).
79. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM & GEOFFREY K. COLLVER, IMMIGRATION OF
AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKERS: POLICY, TRENDS, AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 1
(2003) (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY 1997–1998, Research Report No. 8 (March
2000) (―U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) data estimate that, by 1999, over half
(52%) of U.S. farm workers were unauthorized, up from 37% in 1995.‖)). In point
of fact, the federal H-2A program ―exists to meet agricultural labor shortages‖ and
has been recognized as the ―only thing standing between labor shortages and
significant fines.‖ William M. Ross, The Road to H-2A and Beyond: An Analysis of
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demand for services in the entertainment and prostitution industries
associated with human trafficking is vast.80
The return rate available to actors in ―sending countries‖ from
supplying receiving-country demand in illicit sectors often exceeds
that from legal foreign markets, not to mention local demand. The
price Bolivian farmers can charge for coca base is at least fifty-fold
the price available from legal crops such as coffee or soybeans.81 The
average manufacturing wage in the U.S. was US$23.65, or US$31.81
in the Netherlands, compared to US$2.63 in Mexico, or US$4.54 in
Poland.82 The average income of a farm worker in the U.S. is very
low by U.S. standards—below the poverty line at between
US$10,000 and US$12,49983—but high by comparison to the average
Mexican income of less than 5,000 pesos.84
In addition to price comparisons as drivers of illicit demand and
supply, global economic analysis points to the background dynamics
of shifting resource allocations across markets. Globalization both
dislocates local labor forces (through competition with imported
products) and creates new labor forces (through the creation of new
Migrant Worker Legislation in Agribusiness, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 267, 276–78
(2000) (assessing the program).
80. ELIZABETH BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS: SEXUAL COMMERCE IN
POST-INDUSTRIAL CULTURE 1–7 (2007).
81. In 1999, the ―farmgate‖ price per kilogram of coca base in Bolivia was
estimated by the UN to be US$900. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL
ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000, at 46, U.N. Sales No. E.00.XI.10 (2000) [hereinafter
GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2000]. In 1999, prices for Bolivia‘s major legal
cash crops were US$19 per kilogram of coffee—about two percent of the going
price for the equivalent amount of coca base; and about US$2 per kilo of
soybeans—about 0.2 percent of the coca base price. See id.; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.
OF U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2001, at 9, 13, (FAO Agriculture
Series No. 33,2002) (reporting declining world prices per ton for coffee and only
marginal increase for soybeans in 2000).
82. UNITED STATES DEP‘T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COMPENSATION COSTS FOR
PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING, 2007, at 13 (2009), available at:
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf.
83. Thirty percent of all families below the poverty guidelines. U.S. DEP‘T OF
LABOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC‘Y FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF PROGRAMMATIC
POLICY, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, 2001–
2002,
at
47
(2005),
available
at
www.dol.gov/asp/programs/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf.
84. See Inter-American Development Bank, Statistics on Mexico 1996, Table
I.1 (reflecting a mean national income of 366 pesos per month for the third quintile
of the country population).
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export-competitive sectors). For example, in Mexico, workers may
leave rural farms, being unable to compete with U.S. agribusiness
imports; they may then migrate to where new farm work can be
found, in the U.S.85
In this sense, globalization renders criminal ―ordinary‖ poor people
in developing countries—not only by drawing them to labor markets
in developed countries without documentation status but also by
potentially increasing the lure of cash available in other criminal
markets. (For an acclaimed fictional rendition of this perspective, see
the recent film Maria Full of Grace about a poor Colombian girl who
decides to leave her job in a garment factory to traffic drugs into the
United States.)
Thus, empirical data seem to refute a heretofore-prominent strain
of trade theory, which sees trade and migration as substitutes: that is,
if a labor-rich and capital-rich nation open their borders to each other,
the labor-rich nation will export labor-intensive goods to the capital85. As commentator Philip Martin describes:
Historically, corn in Mexico was highly protected: a guaranteed price of
corn twice the world price has served as the social safety net in rural areas.
Mexico had about 3 million corn farmers in the mid-1990s, but the 75,000
corn farmers in Iowa produced twice as much corn as Mexico, at half the
price. In this example, more US exports of corn will stimulate more
Mexican exports of labor. [Similarly, suppose] Mexican workers are more
productive in the United States than they are in Mexico because of better
public and private infrastructure. Migration can then complement trade.
This occurred when much of the Mexican shoe industry shifted from Leon,
Mexico to Los Angeles, California in the 1980s. The somewhat surprising
result was that shoes produced with Mexican workers in Los Angeles were
exported to Mexico in larger volumes when NAFTA lowered barriers to
trade. By converting less productive Mexican workers into more productive
US workers, NAFTA discouraged the production of a labor-intensive good
in Mexico, and encouraged migration to the United States.
Philip Martin, Mexico-U.S. Migration, (Institute for International Economics,
Working Paper) (on file with author).
In this paper, Martin includes an interesting discussion of the ramifications of
this dynamic for traditional trade theory:
In standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, capital-rich Country N will
import labor-intensive goods from labor-rich Country S. Trade
liberalization shifts additional production of labor-intensive goods to
Country S and capital-intensive goods to Country N. These production
shifts in turn put upward pressure on Country-S wages, discouraging
emigration. By contrast with the standard trade story, when technology
differs between countries, trade and migration can be complements, not
substitutes.
Id.
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rich nation. In fact, where the two nations are producing in the same
sectors, migration and trade can serve as complements: the cheaper
workers from the labor-rich country may migrate to the capital-rich
country to increase productivity even further, and exports from the
capital-rich country will displace workers in the labor-rich country.
Philip Martin has written on how this twist occurred in the context of
NAFTA:
Studies on NAFTA‘s prospective impact agreed that the bulk
of the additional jobs due to NAFTA would be created in
Mexico. One hoped-for side effect of NAFTA was a reduction
in unauthorized migration. This did not happen. Instead, the
number of unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States
rose from an estimated 2.5 million in 1995 to 4.5 million in
2000, representing an annual increase of 400,000 a year.86
Alternatively, illegal migrants may follow a pattern of internalthen-external migration, pursuing new work in domestic border-area
export processing zones from which cross-border migration—
increasingly facilitated by human-smuggling operations—is a short
step. This internal-then-external migration often reverses but
otherwise mirrors transnational capital flows. That is, when a U.S.
business invests in Mexico, old labor markets are displaced and new
labor markets are created, and simultaneously, new transnational
networks in communication and transportation are forged, creating a
hydraulic that draws migrant workers into the stream of transnational
labor markets.87
International capital flows generate yet another lever of dislocation
in the form of currency devaluation. The 1990s featured a series of
very prominent and very similar collapses in ―emerging‖ securities
markets in poor countries—Mexico in the mid-1990s, East Asia in
the late 1990s, and so on. Both market pressure and pressure from the
international community led to concomitant currency devaluations
which proved enormously disruptive to local economies.88 Economic
contraction in local markets, coupled with increased desirability of
86. Id.
87. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL, A
STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW (1990); SASKIA SASSEN,
THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (1991).
88. Martin, supra note 85 (―The number of maquiladoras and their employment
increased sharply after several peso devaluations, and reached a peak of 1.3 million
in 2000.‖).
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hard-currency wages, may well have reinforced the migrant stream
and consequently would have led to some increase in the proportion
of migrants who ―fed‖ illicit markets in one way or another—by
hiring a smuggler so as to find work across the border or by working
in the drug trade, the sex trade, or organized crime.
Movement across such illicit markets occurs more easily against a
background of lowered transaction costs generated by the deep
transformations of economic globalization. These efficiencies in the
global economy arise from both technological gains in transportation
and communication and reduced tariff barriers arising out of trade
liberalization agreements. Increased legal trade-flows across borders
beget increased illegal trade-flows by creating opportunities to use
otherwise legal commercial carriers for smuggling.89 In addition,
increased volume of cross-border traffic translates into decreased
effectiveness of border inspection.90
Thus, globalization is powerfully at work in generating the
material conditions and causes that drive international criminal trade.
This does not mean, from a lawmaker‘s perspective, that
unauthorized migration, for example, should be considered as
equivalent to drug trafficking or the sex trade. Regulatory
considerations relating to political and social costs and benefits will
vary widely across these instances of cross-border illicit economies.
The point here is not to equate all illicit transactions but rather to
demonstrate how conditions of economic globalization contribute to
creating the conditions for transnational illegal markets as well as the
possibility for interlocking effects among these markets.
B. Organized Crime and the Theory of the Firm
With these push and pull dynamics in play, global illicit markets
often display the same complexities of consumption and production
patterns as their counterparts in legal trade and development. 91 The
89. Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International Narcotics Trafficking, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 89, 117–18 (1999).
90. See id. at 120–21.
91. Chantal Thomas, Illegal Markets, Globalized Trade Flows, and International
Legal Relations,(Sep. 22, 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with the UCLA
Friday Faculty Colloquium). The United States Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law has observed that ―[t]he relatively simple charts of drug flows‖ of
previous eras ―now resemble schematic drawings of intricate . . . networks tying
nearly every country in the world to the . . . drug production and trafficking
countries.‖ BUREAU FOR INT‘L NARCOTICS AND LAW, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, INT‘L
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black market version of the ―firm‖ is the organized crime syndicate.
The famed economist Ronald Coase‘s ―theory of the firm‖ predicts
that businesses will consolidate and internalize some kinds of market
activities to reduce transaction costs and, where possible, extract
monopoly rents.92 Consequently, some market actors will coordinate
and consolidate channels of production, distribution, and marketing.
Thus, as criminalization makes doing business more difficult,
Coase‘s theory predicts that illegal firms will consolidate to
internalize costs. Prohibition may therefore lead to larger and betterorganized crime. Relatedly, prohibition may increase the violence
and instability associated with illicit transactions, since illegal
contract disputes cannot be resolved using the legal system.
Moreover, criminal prohibitions, by restricting supply, can lead to
a significant increase in the market price of the restricted item, so that
some suppliers who can still access the market enjoy a price-increase
―windfall‖—a perverse consequence of a restriction that sought to
weaken them.93 Such restrictions are also said to be relatively
susceptible to corruption, because they encourage rent-seeking actors
to mobilize to monopolize the restricted market.94 Thus, suppliers use
some of the windfall to pay off law enforcement authorities, retaining
the rest and coming out ahead in the bargain.
In addition, because these prohibitions also impose increased costs
associated with greater difficulty in gaining market access and the
risk of prosecution, they may have the effect of increasing the
monopoly power of suppliers who are able and willing to absorb the
increased costs—hence the tendency towards large and internally
hierarchical crime syndicates in which ―kingpins‖ are protected by
layers of rank-and-file operators. In the case of illegal markets, this
NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (1998).
92. For an overview of Coasian theory as applied to the firm, see Stewart J.
Schwab, Coase‟s Twin Towers: The Relation between The Nature of the Firm and
The Problem of Social Cost, 18 J. CORP. L. 359, 360–62 (1993).
93. For a general explanation of the economic theory of the effect of restrictions
on gains from trade, see RICHARD E. CAVES, JEFFREY A. FRANKEL & RONALD W.
JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION (10th ed. 2007).
94. Cf. Jimmye S. Hillman, Nontariff Barriers: Major Problem in Agricultural
Trade, 60 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 491, 492–93 (1978) (describing the phenomenon in
a more typical trade setting, that of quantitative restrictions on agricultural
imports). For a description of this problem in Latin America, see Luz Estella Nagle,
The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin America, 26
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 1649, 1679–81 (2003).
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effect means that those suppliers who can survive criminal law
enforcement attempts actually enjoy greater market power than they
might have in the absence of criminal prohibition. This dynamic may
well encourage the development and consolidation of powerful
organized crime—another perverse consequence of the prohibitions
that sought to eliminate the crime. Given the relatively high
transaction costs associated with illegal business, criminalization may
have the effect of making organized crime more likely and more
dominant.
Under such background economic conditions, Coase‘s theory of
the firm predicts not that the incidence of illicit market transactions
would not diminish as a result of criminalization but rather would be
largely unaffected but that organized crime groups would gain
ascendance over less centralized regimes as intermediators of those
transactions.
The stated objectives of international criminal trade law and
related enforcement efforts are, firstly, to reduce the incidence of
these crimes and, secondly, to increase border security. For the
foregoing reasons, however, these prohibitionist measures appear to
be suboptimal. Suboptimality results not only from limited
effectiveness but also from the regime‘s effect of exacerbating the
very problems it seeks to solve.
Despite these policing efforts, illicit markets continue to provide
an important source of revenue for many developing economies.95
Most troubling, organized crime appears to be overtaking more
decentralized modes of supplying markets for illegal drugs and
migrant labor.96 The shift to organized crime increases the likelihood
95. See U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A
GLOBAL THEMATIC EVALUATION, at 1–2, U.N. Sales No. E.05.XI.13 (2005). The
United States government has sought to reassure the international community that
the current approach has been successful despite some evidence to the contrary.
Compare U.N. Says Afghan Poppy Cultivation Could Rise After Last Year‟s
Record, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., March 6, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/artic
les/ap/ 2007/03/06/asia/AS-GEN-Afghan-Drugs.php, with U.S. Official Claims
Progress in Ending Opium Cultivation in Northern Afghanistan, INT‘L HERALD
TRIB., March 9, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/09/euro
pe/EU-GEN-US-Afghan-Drugs.php.
96. Louise Shelley, Crime Victimizes Both Society and Democracy, 6 GLOBAL
ISSUES 19, 19 (2001), available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/t
ransnational-crime/gj06.htm (―The increasing visibility, assets, and political
influence of organized criminal groups have become a matter of mounting
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of terrorist involvement.97
The theory of the firm explains the syndication of illicit market
activities but not the distinctive features of organized crime in its
heavy use of violence and intimidation. These tactics can be
explained, however, as ordering techniques employed in the absence
of nonviolent means of settling disputes through the legal system or
through other ―mainstream‖ processes. Thus, the shift to organized
crime also increases the violence and associated dangers of illegal
transactions.
The circumstances of illegal migration show most starkly the
human cost of these newer, more virulent strains of criminal trade:
although illegal migrants have not declined in numbers,98 they are
more likely to take more dangerous routes99 and to employ the
services of organized criminal operators.100 Death rates have
increased for illegal migrants as measures have been implemented to
crack down on national borders.101 If it is true that the consequences
of deep criminalization make the problem worse, then it is not a
wholly rational endeavor assuming that the reduction of criminality is
in fact the goal.

international concern in recent years.‖).
97. See Donnie Marshall, Narco-Terrorism: The New Discovery of an Old
Connection, 35 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 599, 601–03 (2002); Alexandra V. Orlova &
James W. Moore, “Umbrellas” or “Building Blocks”?: Defining International
Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in International Law, 27 HOUS. J.
INT‘L L. 267, 303–06 (2005) (emphasizing the evolving nature of the
interrelationships between organized crime, terrorism, and ―legitimate society‖ and
summarizing the difficulties this imposes on precise definitions).
98. Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 121, 131 (2001) (providing statistics to show that the increase in
border policing under the U.S. government‘s Operation Gatekeeper has not
decreased ―apprehension levels‖).
99. Id. at 135.
100. See generally Jacqueline Marie Hall, Sink or Swim: The Deadly
Consequences of People Smuggling, 12 IND. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 365 (2002)
(describing migrant smuggling in Europe and Australia).
101. Daniel A. Scharf, For Humane Borders: Two Decades of Death and Illegal
Activity in the Sonoran Desert, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L 141, 143 (2006) (―[T]he
death toll for people illegally migrating into the United States . . . along the U.S.Mexico border . . . in the America‘s Southwestern Deserts has risen since the U.S.
government launched Operation Gatekeeper in 1994.‖).
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VI. MATERIAL ORDERING EFFECTS: THE SHADOWED TERRAIN
THE MIGRANT WORKER

OF

The above sections have described how, in the pluralistic array of
international legal regimes potentially governing illegal migration,
the most prominent and influential norms arise within international
criminal law. Given that international criminal law and its
prohibitions will probably not significantly reduce the level of
unauthorized migration but may increase the dangers and threats
associated with it, the overarching result increasingly situates migrant
labor against a relief of fear and prosecution.
This section details some of the ways in which U.S. lawmaking,
subsequent to the emergence of the Crime Conventions, has operated
to strengthen and reinforce the criminality of the undocumented
migrant worker. Such effects might be viewed as correlations or
results of activity on the international terrain—the directionality of
causation is less a concern here than demonstrating the argument that
national legal events are a part of the same global social field which
the international legal regimes described above also inhabit.
The wave of debates over and proposals for immigration reform in
the United States are probably the most salient among these effects.
Despite repeated efforts by U.S. President Bush to promote a guest
worker law that would ease entry by migrant workers, the U.S.
legislature—which tends to be more closely tied to populist
sentiment—repeatedly proved hostile.102 Moreover, even a guest
worker program may only temporarily reduce rather than abate the
problem, since its restrictions and requirements might have the effect
of turning once-legal guest workers into illegal migrants. Populist
sentiment has also encouraged some U.S. states to act ostentatiously
to convey concern about illegal immigration.103 Indeed, illegal
immigration was a campaign issue in the U.S. presidential election of
2008 and is likely to remain contentious in the future.
102. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (―In the final years of the Bush
Administration, several attempts were made to expand existing guest worker
programs to enable the admission of greater numbers of workers, primarily through
broadening the definition of the types of workers eligible for the temporary
visas.‖).
103. See, e.g., ‗State of Emergency‟ Changes the Border Political Fight, USA
TODAY, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-30-borderemergency_x.htm.
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Less widely known, perhaps, than these events in the political
processes of the executive and legislative branch are changes in the
law arising out of the judicial process. Yet immigration advocates see
these changes as at least as devastating for migrant workers. In
particular, the 2002 Supreme Court decision of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board104 found that
undocumented workers who are laid off because of their union
organizing efforts have no recourse under U.S. labor law.
In the same case, ten years before, the National Labor Relations
Board had found that ―four union supporters had sufficient seniority
that they would have been retained absent their discriminatory
selection for layoff.‖105 As the case worked its way up the appeals
process, as late as January 2001, the federal appeals court for the
District of Columbia held that the U.S. labor relations statute did not
bar undocumented employees from receiving back pay as a remedy
for undocumented workers who were discriminatorily laid off due to
their union organizing efforts.106
The Supreme Court majority in Hoffman justified its holding
straightforwardly, arguing that extending labor law protections to
undocumented workers would ―trivialize‖ U.S. immigration laws.
Yet, the dissenting opinion rejected the proposition that the
majority could ―comfortably rest its conclusion upon the immigration
laws‘ purposes.‖107 In doing so, the dissent alluded to the underlying
forces of globalization:
For one thing, the general purpose of the immigration statute‘s
employment prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of
employment, which like a magnet pulls illegal immigrants
towards the United States. To permit . . . backpay could not
significantly increase the strength of this magnetic force, for so
speculative a future possibility could not realistically influence
an individual‘s decision to migrate illegally.
To deny . . . backpay, however, might very well increase
104. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
105. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. and Casimiro Arauz, an Individual, 306
NLRB 17 (1992).
106. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
107. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the strength of this magnetic force. That denial lowers the cost
to the employer of an initial labor law violation (provided . . .
that the victims are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the
employer‘s incentive to find and hire illegal-alien
employees.108
Thus, the result of the Hoffman decision is that the employer was
able to ―dismiss[] an employee for trying to organize a union—a
crude and obvious violation of the labor laws‖ were it not for the
majority‘s decision to withhold the protection of those laws.109
The dissenting justices pointed to a troubling effect of the
crackdown on illegal immigration in a context where globalization
renders such immigration inevitable—intentionally or not, the
crackdown has the effect of rendering workers more vulnerable to
abuses by employers. Not only will the law refuse to help
undocumented workers in any efforts they might make to protect
themselves against employer abuse or to improve their workplace
conditions; documented, legal workers will also find their own
bargaining efforts undermined, since the employer can hire
undocumented workers who can be abused with impunity.
In this sense, it has occurred to me that a useful thought
experiment is to compare the laws enforcing chattel slavery in the
antebellum United States with those enforcing immigration laws
today. What made slavery a product of the law was that, as long as
someone held the status of slave and another the status of his or her
slaveowner, the law would not only refuse to give the slave recourse
against the slaveowner but would also aid the slaveowner in
maintaining the slave in a position of complete vulnerability.
Consider, for example, the Fugitive Slave Law, which required the
return of runaway slaves.
Slavery could work as a system of extreme subordination only
because of a social field in which a vulnerable population was
prevented from exercising rights against its controllers. While the
term ―modern-day slavery‖ is used by, for example, anti-trafficking
and anti-slavery spokespersons to describe forced prostitution or
compulsory labor in the developing world, we should consider the
extent to which immigration laws in developed countries, operating
108. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
109. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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against a social field of globalization, in a context of international
criminalization of migrants, might resemble slavery laws to an
uncomfortable degree.
The immediate response to this argument would be that slaves did
not choose to enter the territories in which they were enslaved,
whereas illegal migrants do make that choice. Thus, the
persuasiveness of the argument depends on the degree to which one
accepts that economic coercion is a social fact and factor in the larger
complex of globalizing forces. Of course, even if migrant workers
choose to enter into such circumstances because of the benefits
available there from remittances and higher wages, social justice
concerns still necessitate the improvement of workplace conditions.
Following Hoffman, U.S. and Mexican labor unions filed a
complaint with the ILO Committee alleging that the U.S. Supreme
Court‘s decision violated the ILO treaties mentioned in Part II, above.
The Committee observed that ―the impact of Hoffman . . . includes
undocumented workers hired by employers in full knowledge of their
status and who may subsequently be dismissed for exercising their
fundamental right to organize in an effort to ensure respect for basic
worker‘s rights.‖110 The Committee concluded that ―the remedial
measures left [under U.S. labor law] in cases of illegal dismissals of
undocumented workers are inadequate to ensure effective protection
against acts of anti-union discrimination.‖111
At the same time, the Committee declined to specify ―what precise
remedy‖ would fulfill international law principles of
nondiscrimination and freedom of association.112 Thus, the
Committee ―invite[d] the Government to explore . . . possible
solutions.‖113
In this way, liberal, egalitarian impulses within international law
have been recognized, but ultimately subordinated, to a concept of
the undocumented migrant worker as a criminal.114
110. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the
Government of the United States Presented by AFL-CIO, Case. No. 2524, para.
856, in 349th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO Doc.
GB.301/8, para. 749 (2008, Series B).
111. Id. para. 610.
112. Id. para. 611.
113. Id.
114. ―This Court has consistently set aside . . . backpay awards to employees
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VII. CONCLUSION
The above analysis has considered the case of illegal markets,
particularly the market for illegal migration, through the lens of legal
pluralism. This scenario is one not just of legal pluralism but also
legal fragmentation.115 Indeed, in his influential report on
fragmentation for the International Law Commission, Martti
Koskenniemi describes the problem at hand:
―Trade law‖ develops as an instrument to regulate international
economic relations. ―Human rights law‖ aims to protect the
interests of individuals and ‗international criminal law‖ gives
legal expression to the ―fight against impunity.‖ Each rulecomplex or ―regime‖ comes with its own principles, its own
form of expertise and its own ―ethos,‖ not necessarily identical
to the ethos of neighbouring specialization.116
Koskenniemi addresses the juristic problems posed when legal
regimes collide with each other not only in their specific rules but
also in their larger goals. Thus, although the general thrust of trade
law is to liberalize markets, and the general thrust of human rights
law is to protect individuals, both of these regimes tend not to reach,
formally or informally, the issues posed by illegal migration. At the
same time, the general effect of criminalization, promoted both
internationally and nationally, may be viewed as hostile not only to
the liberalization of markets for migrant labor but possibly also to the
protection of individual migrant workers.
―Global legal pluralism . . . is not simply a result of political
pluralism, but is instead the expression of deep contradictions
between colliding sectors of a global society.‖117 This legal pluralism
found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment.‖
Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (Syllabus).
115. See Fragmentation, supra note 8, para. 8 (defining fragmentation as ―the
emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes,
legal institutions and spheres of practice‖).
[S]uch specialized law-making and institution-building tends to take place
with relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the
adjoining fields and of the general principles and practices of international
law. The result is conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating
institutional practices and, possibly, loss of an overall perspective on the
law.
Id.
116. Id. para. 15.
117. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The
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is not necessarily the juristic kind as traditionally understood; that is,
the ―transfer of whole legal systems across cultural boundaries‖ has
occurred in territories that were subjected to colonial rule.118 At the
same time, the immediately preceding paragraph suggests that juristic
pluralism may appear here, if it is defined as a situation in which the
―sovereign commands different bodies of law for different groups of
the population varying by ethnicity, religion, nationality, or
geography, and when the parallel legal regimes are all on dependent
on the state legal system.‖119
One could argue that national regimes (enforced through
international law in both its assertions and its omissions) prohibiting
migration, in a context where it is inevitable given the dynamics of
globalization, in fact maintain, in an ongoing rather than contingent
or temporary fashion, a system in which undocumented workers are
acknowledged and expected but, by virtue of their status, are subject
to a different (and lesser) system of laws. In a world where territorial
boundaries are porous but nevertheless serve as a basis for
distinguishing identity,120 this system of managing persons according
to documentary status seriously reinforces global socioeconomic
hierarchy.

Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J.
INT‘L L. 999, 1004 (2004).
118. Barry Hooker, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND
NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 1 (1975).
119. Merry, supra note 1, at 871.
120. See generally Richard T. Ford, Law‟s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction),
97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999).

